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INTRODUCTION
The oil and gas industry has been the fuel driving Louisiana’s
economy for decades.1 Given their proximity to the Gulf of Mexico,
Louisiana and its economy are uniquely intertwined with the oil and gas
industry.2 As of 2002, the total direct and indirect economic impact of
drilling and production activities in Louisiana totaled approximately one
billion dollars per year, with the estimated total employment from these
activities amounting to nearly 6,600 jobs in the state.3 In 2018, however,
33% of all drilling activity in the United States occurred in the Permian
Basin in Texas and New Mexico, and an insignificant percentage of
nationwide drilling activity occurred in Louisiana.4 In that same year,
Louisiana’s economy ranked 44th.5 With the number of active rigs on the
outer continental shelf projected to slowly rise in the near future, the time
is now for the Louisiana Legislature to lift the restrictions on indemnity
and risk allocation6 in oilfield contracts.7 If the state legislature does not
act swiftly, the oil and gas sector in Louisiana may never recover, and
1. Allan G. Pulsipher, Cumulative and Transitory Effects of Offshore Oil
and Gas Development on Personal Income in Louisiana’s Coastal Parishes: 1969
to 2000, in 1 HISTORY OF THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN SOUTHERN
LOUISIANA 219 (2008).
2. Id.
3. ROBERT H. BAUMANN ET. AL, LSU CTR. FOR ENERGY STUD., ANALYSIS
OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES ON STATE
LEASES (2002), http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/mineral/formspubs/
ecoreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEN3-HJDC]. Estimated total employment from
direct and indirect drilling and production activities in Louisiana is nearly 6,600
jobs. Id.
4. DAVID E. DISMUKES ET AL., LSU CTR. FOR ENERGY STUD. & LSU E.J.
OURSO COLL. OF BUS. ECON. & POL’Y RES. GRP., 2019 GULF COAST ENERGY
OUTLOOK 3 (2018), https://www.lsu.edu/ces/presentations/2018/gceo-kickoffpresentation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UHR-Q3GY].
5. U.S. N E WS & W ORL D R EP OR T , B E ST S T ATE S 2018: R ANK ING
PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT ALL 50 STATES (2018), https://media.beam.us
news.com/ba/b2/c75f31c94080b1d8a17931bcddd0/171206-best-states-overallrankings-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NHQ-2DLF].
6. “Risk allocation” refers to the assignment of responsibility and liability
to a specific party in the event certain losses arise; this assignment is accomplished
through contractual provisions. See generally Harold J. Flanagan & Stephen M.
Pesce, What You Really Need to Know About How Master Service Agreements
and Risk Allocation Provisions Work, Even If You Hope to Never Have to Write
One, 3 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Paper No. 9, §§ 6.01, 6.03 (2013), Westlaw
2013 No. 3 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 9.
7. DISMUKES ET AL., supra note 4.
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Louisiana’s economy could fall even lower in the state rankings during the
upcoming years.8
The Louisiana Legislature ended regardless-of-fault risk allocation in
oil and gas contracts in 1981 with the enactment of the Louisiana Oilfield
Anti-Indemnity Act (LOIA).9 The prosperity of the oil and gas industry
during the 20th century brought vast amounts of wealth and power to big
oil companies. The wealth of these oil companies gave them significant
leverage in drafting agreements with service companies and other
contractors.10 Oil companies used this leverage to force service companies
and other contractors into agreeing to indemnity provisions that required
the contractors to indemnify the oil company for its own negligence or
fault, and to procure insurance in favor of the oil company.11 Through the
LOIA, the Louisiana Legislature curbed this practice.12 The LOIA
completely removed parties’ freedom to allocate risks in virtually any
oilfield contract in Louisiana.13 The only remaining method of risk
allocation is provided through the Marcel exception to the LOIA.14 The
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Marcel v. Placid Oil Co. permits an oil company
8. See generally U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 5.
9. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780 (2018).
10. Diogenis C. Panagiotis, Offshore Update – Five Years after Passage:
Contractual Indemnity, Defense and Insurance under the Louisiana Oilfield
Indemnity Act, 10 MAR. LAW. 203, 203 (1985). “Service companies” are
contractors and subcontractors who provide goods and services to exploration and
production (E&P) companies. See generally Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6, at §
6.01. E&P companies find the hydrocarbons, hire various contractors to aid in the
extractions of the hydrocarbons, sell the raw materials to companies that refine
them, and often act as the operator on a job. Rebecca McClay, How the Oil and
Gas Industry Works, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.in
vestopedia.com/investing/oil-gas-industry-overview/ [https://perma.cc/GM3WDC3J]. Given that the E&P companies are the ones hiring the service companies,
they naturally have more bargaining power. Hereinafter, the term “oil company”
will be used to refer to the exploration and production company or operator
company that hires the contractors to perform work, and that has the superior
bargaining power and control.
11. Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 203.
12. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780.
13. See generally id. Courts in Louisiana have interpreted the scope of the
LOIA broadly such that it can apply to virtually “any contract [in Louisiana] in
which an oil company is a party.” G. Roth Kehoe II, The Louisiana Oilfield
Indemnity Act: A Necessary Limit to Contract Freedom or Paternalism for
Roughneck Contracts?, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1996).
14. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780; Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th
Cir. 1994).
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to obtain insurance coverage as an additional insured on the contractor’s
insurance policy as long as the oil company pays the “material part” of the
premium.15 Both Louisiana state courts and federal courts applying
Louisiana law have created uncertainty and ambiguity in interpreting and
applying the Marcel exception.16 This ambiguity hinders the ability of
parties to evaluate potential risk exposure and to contractually manage
such risk exposure through risk-allocation provisions.17
The ambiguities surrounding the Marcel exception show that this
exception has fallen short of meeting parties’ need for predictability in risk
allocation.18 The high probability of bodily injury to workers, along with
the large amount of money invested in oil and gas operations, increases
parties’ need to rely upon predictable risk-allocation outcomes.19 Given
the disjointed state of case law addressing the Marcel exception, parties to
oilfield contracts who intend to obtain Marcel coverage cannot readily
predict whether courts will honor the terms of their risk management
schemes.20 Neither the Louisiana Supreme Court nor the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has definitively ruled on whether Marcel coverage
extends to third parties to the contract who do not independently pay a
Marcel premium.21 Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
addressed the Marcel exception more generally, and federal and state
courts in Louisiana have interpreted and applied the Marcel exception
inconsistently.22
15. See generally Marcel, 11 F.3d 563.
16. See, e.g., Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002);
Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington Ins., 745 So. 2d 676
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. William W. Pugh III, Overview of Risk Allocation in Operational
Contracts, 2018 ADVANCED OIL, GAS & ENERGY RES. 4-11 (2018), Westlaw 2018
TXCLE-AOGERL 4-II.
20. Rogers, 308 F.3d at 478 (citing the confused state of the law surrounding
the enforceability of additional-insured endorsements under the LOIA as
justification for refusing to hold that insurer’s actions in withdrawal of oil
company’s defense against claim of injured employee of contractor amounted to
bad faith). To be explicitly clear, under the LOIA, additional insured
endorsements are only valid to cover the principal’s negligence when the
agreement falls within the Marcel exception. Id. Therefore, the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was noting the confused state of the law surrounding the Marcel
exception. See generally id.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. Compare Rogers, 308 F.3d 477, with Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992
Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington Ins., 745 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
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Given the state’s history as an oil and gas powerhouse, Louisiana has
an interest in incentivizing exploration and production companies to invest
in drilling and production activity in the state.23 The Louisiana Legislature
should resolve this issue by amending the LOIA to provide a means for
parties to indemnify each other on a regardless-of-fault basis.24 The Texas
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (TOIA) is similar to the LOIA, but it contains
an exception under which parties can agree to indemnify one another on a
regardless-of-fault basis.25 Louisiana should follow industry leaders—
specifically, Texas—in codifying a new exception that will remove the
inequity foisted upon oil companies and their contractors by the LOIA and
by the courts applying it, while still serving the major policy objective of
the LOIA—protecting Louisiana contractors and service companies.26
Part I of this Comment will examine risk allocation in operational
contracts generally and discuss the major provisions of the LOIA as well
as the policy considerations behind it. Next, Part II will survey Louisiana
jurisprudence addressing the Marcel exception to demonstrate the lack of
clarity surrounding it. Finally, Part III will propose a legislative solution—
specifically, the adoption of the exception provided for under the TOIA.
I. RISK ALLOCATION IN OPERATIONAL CONTRACTS
Oil and gas companies use operational agreements such as master
service agreements (MSAs) to contract for the performance of work on a
project that will last for weeks, months, or even years.27 A single MSA
will often govern the relationship between an oil company and its
contractor for an extended period of time.28 Parties typically use MSAs
23. See generally Pulsipher, supra note 1.
24. Regardless-of-fault indemnity is a form of regardless-of-fault risk
allocation that assigns responsibility for a loss or losses to a pre-designated party
without regard to cause, negligence, or fault of any party. Flanagan & Pesce, supra
note 6, at § 6.02. Commonly, parties agree to allocate risk according to the party
with “ownership” of the injured employee. Id.
25. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005 (West 2019).
26. See generally Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 205.
27. William W. Pugh, A Strategic Look at the Bigger Picture – Risk
Allocation in Oil and Gas Operational Agreements, 4 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L.
FOUND. Paper No. 7 (2008), Westlaw 2008 No. 4 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 7.
28. Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6, at § 6.01. “An MSA is a traditional
means of retaining a contractor or a subcontractor to perform work on a given
project, on either a one time or long-term basis. In the pure sense, however, the
MSA merely provides the framework for tasks to be performed by a
contractor . . . . A contract between the E&P company, and a contractor . . . for a
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when there is a common workplace for multiple contractors and
subcontractors, and a relatively high risk of bodily injury and property
damage.29 Risk management is essential in operations of this sort, and
parties manage these risks by inserting risk-allocation provisions in their
MSAs.30 Due to both the complex nature of the jobsites and the large
number of contractors and subcontractors involved in oil and gas
operations, when an employee sustains injuries, courts often face difficulty
in determining which party is at fault.31 Typically, there are two disputes
to resolve: (1) a tort suit brought by the injured employee against the
defendants who are potentially liable for the injuries, except for the
employer of the injured employee,32 and (2) a contract suit among those
defendants and the employer of the injured employee to determine fault
allocations and responsibility for the costs of any settlement or judgment.33
By allocating risks before a loss arises, provisions in the MSA can resolve
the dispute between the defendants and the employer of the injured
employee.34 Although the injured employee’s third-party tort claim still
has to be resolved, the risk-allocation provisions in the MSA eliminate the
contractual dispute between the employer of the injured employee and the
third-party tortfeasors by allocating responsibility for the losses of the
injured employee back to his or her employer.35 In this way, risk allocation
provides parties with predictability, and it can save parties the time and
expenses associated with further litigation.36 Predictable outcomes are

particular job is formed upon the issuance of the oral or written purchase or work
order.” Id. at § 6.02.
29. Pugh, supra note 27.
30. Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
31. Richard C. Beu & Donald P. Butler, Oilfield Master Service Agreements:
Indemnities and Associated Insurance Provisions, 2 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.
Paper No. 10A (2004), Westlaw 2004 No. 2 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 10A.
32. Workers’ compensation bars negligence suits by injured employees
against their employers. In both onshore and offshore oil and gas operations, there
is a governing workers’ compensation scheme that bars an employee from suing
his employer for negligence. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032(A) (2018) (workers’
compensation statute that applies when the operations occur onshore, or offshore
on a fixed platform located in Louisiana state territorial waters); see also 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018) (workers’ compensation statute that applies when the
operations occur offshore on a fixed platform on the outer continental shelf).
33. Beu & Butler, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally id.
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useful to parties during negotiations and as they plan to appropriately
protect against the potential risks that may arise during a future project.37
The exploration, drilling, and production of oil and gas are extremely
hazardous activities.38 Further, exploring for and producing oil and gas are
expensive endeavors, whether onshore or offshore.39 Given the high stakes
and high probability of risk, oil companies and contractors prepare for
uncertainties in advance by inserting carefully drafted risk-allocation
provisions in the MSA.40 Oil companies, due to their wealth and industry
control, typically command stronger bargaining power than the individual
contractors who bid for their jobs.41 Prior to the enactment of antiindemnity statutes in various states, oil companies used their bargaining
strength to strong-arm contractors into agreeing to provide insurance and
indemnity to the oil company, regardless of the negligence or fault of the
oil company.42
A. The Louisiana Legislature Jumps into the Arm-Wrestling Match and
Puts an End to “Strong-Arming”
Courts typically uphold regardless-of-fault indemnity agreements
unless the agreement is contrary to public policy.43 In general, risk-shifting
indemnity agreements that extend to losses arising out of a party’s
negligence or fault are not against public policy in Louisiana.44 The LOIA
provides an exception to this general rule, declaring provisions in oilfield
contracts that allow a party to obtain indemnity for losses arising out of its
own negligence or fault to be against the public policy of the State of
Louisiana.45
37. See generally id.
38. Knapp v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 1996).
39. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
TRENDS IN U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM COSTS (2016), https://
www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF6AGPVH].
40. See generally Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
41. Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 203.
42. Id.
43. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:19 (4th ed. 2019), Westlaw
WILLSTN-CN § 19:19.
44. Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1098.
45. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A) (2018). The single, stated intent of the
legislature in enacting the LOIA was to “declare null and void and against [the]
public policy of the state of Louisiana any provision in any agreement which
requires defense and/or indemnification, for death or bodily injury to persons,
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The LOIA was the result of intense lobbying efforts on the part of
Louisiana service companies.46 In response to fear of being forced out of
the market by competitors who could afford to agree to the inclusion of
regardless-of-fault indemnity clauses, service companies had to either bear
the burden of the indemnity or lose out on jobs.47 The LOIA voids
provisions in oilfield contracts that require a party to indemnify another
for the negligence or fault of the other.48 To prevent oil companies from
strong-arming service companies into contracts whereby the service
company had to agree to indemnify the oil company for the consequences
arising from the negligence or fault of the oil company, the Louisiana
Legislature enacted the LOIA.49 Subsection A of the LOIA declares that
“an inequity is foisted on certain contractors” by certain indemnity
provisions in oilfield contracts.50 It is unclear exactly what the perceived
inequity as stated in subsection A refers to.51 Scholars have concluded that
this inequity encompasses the situation in which an oil company uses its
superior bargaining power and wealth as leverage to force the service
company to agree to indemnify the oil company for its negligence or
fault.52 Even in situations where the contractor is not one that needs
protection from the oil company, courts have held steadfast to the public
policy principles behind the LOIA.53 In such cases, courts will strike
indemnity provisions from the MSA “to preserve fairness of competition
among oilfield service contractors.”54
The ambiguities surrounding the legislative intent and the lack of
legislative history accompanying the LOIA have led courts in Louisiana
to interpret the LOIA broadly and to accord their own “spirit” to the
LOIA.55 Courts have stated that the LOIA is an attempt to improve
where there is negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee.”
Id.
46. See Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 254 (La. 1990); Panagiotis,
supra note 10 at 208.
47. Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 203.
48. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780.
49. See generally Panagiotis, supra note 10.
50. LA REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A).
51. See generally Panagiotis, supra note 10.
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A). See generally Panagiotis, supra note 10, at
204.
53. See Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington Ins.,
745 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Knapp v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir.
1996); Moser v. Aminoil, U.S.A., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 774, 780 (W.D. La. 1985);
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safety.56 Safety, however, is not mentioned in the LOIA.57 Nonetheless,
courts have found that the promotion of safety is an underlying policy of
the LOIA, reasoning that if the oil company, as opposed to the contractor,
will be financially responsible for its own negligence, the oil company is
more likely to take steps towards the promotion of safety.58 Courts have
stated that the policy goals of the Louisiana Legislature in enacting the
LOIA include the following: (1) protecting offshore service companies
from oil companies that have greater bargaining power; (2) prohibiting an
indemnitee from being indemnified for its own negligence; and (3)
promoting safety in offshore oil and gas operations.59 Subsection B of the
LOIA implements the policy directives established by subsection A of the
LOIA.60
B. Regardless of the Terms of the Agreement, the LOIA Voids
Regardless-of-Fault Indemnity
Subsection B of the LOIA declares null and void certain indemnity
agreements that require the indemnitor to indemnify or defend the
indemnitee for damages arising out of the indemnitee’s negligence or
fault.61 Although the prohibition on regardless-of-fault indemnity
contained in the LOIA is absolute, the LOIA only applies in specific
situations.62 This prohibition only applies to injuries arising out of death
or bodily injury to persons.63 The LOIA does not nullify indemnity
agreements that pertain to property damages.64 Moreover, the LOIA
Bryant v. Platform Well Serv., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. La. 1983); see
also Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 206.
56. Knapp, 781 F.2d at 1130; Moser, 618 F. Supp. at 780; Bryant, 563 F.
Supp. at 763.
57. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780.
58. See, e.g., Knapp, 781 F.2d at 1130; Moser, 618 F. Supp. at 780; Bryant,
563 F. Supp. at 763.
59. See Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 208.
60. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A)–(B).
61. Id. The indemnitor is the party who pays the indemnity. The indemnitee
is the party who receives the indemnity. Michael Golemi & William Pugh, Hoping
for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: “Don’t Worry, We Have Indemnity,” 78
ADVOC. (TEX.) 47, 47 (2017).
62. See generally LA REV. STAT. § 9:2780.
63. See id. § 9:2780(B).
64. See id. It is good practice to bifurcate indemnity provisions in the master
service agreement—one provision that applies to property damage, and another
provision that applies to injury to persons, because different results will obtain
under the LOIA depending on whether the damages arise out of personal injury
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prohibits indemnity and defense provisions where the indemnitee is
negligent or at fault; it does not apply where the indemnitee is not
negligent or at fault.65 The LOIA does extend its nullifying reach,
however, to certain insurance agreements.66
Subsection G of the LOIA bolsters the protection provided by
subsection B by prohibiting insurance agreements that would undermine
the prohibition and purpose of the LOIA.67 Parties can circumvent
statutory prohibitions on contractual indemnity through contractual
liability insurance coverage.68 This circumvention can be accomplished by
requiring that the indemnitor name the indemnitee as an additional insured
on the indemnitor’s insurance policy.69 These types of insurance
agreements allow the indemnitee to shift its risk to the indemnitor’s
insurance company.70 The Louisiana Legislature—clearly aware of these
insurance-related workarounds—wrote subsection G of the LOIA to
nullify such insurance arrangements.71 Accordingly, subsection G of the
LOIA nullifies any waiver of subrogation, additional named insured
endorsement, and any other form of insurance coverage that would
circumvent the indemnity-voiding provisions of the LOIA.72
Courts typically find that any provision in an agreement requiring the
contractor to extend its insurance coverage to cover the principal’s acts of
negligence or fault are void under the LOIA because these insurance
agreements undermine the purpose of the LOIA and allow indemnitees to
obtain indemnity for their negligence or fault.73 Although they are not
indemnity agreements per se, these insurance arrangements frustrate the
or property injury. Julia M. Adams & Karen K. Milhollin, Indemnity on the Outer
Continental Shelf—A Practical Primer, 27 TUL. MAR. L. J. 43, 89 (2002).
65. Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
66. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(G). The LOIA prohibits “waivers of
subrogation, additional named insured endorsements, or any other form of
insurance protection which would frustrate or circumvent the prohibitions of [the
LOIA].” Id.
67. Id.
68. SCOTT TURNER, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES
§ 10:16 (2d ed. Nov. 2020), Westlaw ICCDS § 10:16.
69. Id.
70. Daniel B. Shilliday et al., Contractual Risk-Shifting in Offshore Energy
Operations, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2007).
71. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(G).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002);
Roberts v. Energy Dev. Corp., 235 F.3d 935 (5th. Cir. 2000); Hodgen v. Forest
Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512 (5th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. Se.,
Inc., 864 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1989).
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purpose of the LOIA by shifting the economic burden of the indemnitee’s
negligence or fault onto the indemnitor by requiring the indemnitor to
purchase insurance covering losses that arise out of the indemnitee’s fault
or negligence.74 In certain oilfield contracts in Louisiana, parties cannot
circumvent the regardless-of-fault indemnification ban of the LOIA by
agreeing that a party will purchase insurance in favor of the other party.75
Pursuant to subsections B and G of the LOIA, parties are prohibited from
inserting indemnity provisions and certain insurance arrangements in their
contract; thus, it is important for parties to determine whether the LOIA
applies to their agreement.76 Subsection C of the LOIA governs whether
an agreement falls within the scope of the LOIA.77
C. The Scope of Application of the LOIA
The LOIA applies to those oilfield contracts that “pertain to a well.”78
Part C of the LOIA states that “the term ‘agreement,’ as it pertains to a
well for oil, [or] gas . . . means any agreement . . . concerning any
operations related to the exploration, development, production, or
transportation of oil, [or] gas.”79 In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. Transportation Insurance Co., the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
interpreting subsection C, set forth a two-part test to determine whether
the LOIA applies to a given contract.80 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corporation (Transco) entered into an MSA with Associated Painting
Services (APS) in which APS agreed to perform certain work on Transco’s
pipelines and platforms located in the Gulf of Mexico and the adjacent
marshlands of Louisiana.81 Pursuant to the agreement, APS named
Transco as an additional insured on its insurance policy.82 During the
course of the job, an APS employee sustained injuries on a Transco
platform on the outer continental shelf off Louisiana’s coast.83

74. Jefferson v. Int’l Marine, LLC, 224 So. 3d 50, 54 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2017).
75. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(G).
76. See id. § 9:2780(B), (G).
77. See id. § 9:2780(C).
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins., 953 F.2d 985, 991 (5th
Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 986.
82. Id. at 986–87.
83. Id. at 987.
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The APS employee filed suit against Transco, who eventually settled
the case with the employee for $225,000.84 Transco then filed suit against
APS’s insurer, Transportation Insurance Co. (TIC), alleging that the
contract between Transco and APS obliged APS to name Transco as an
additional insured and that TIC’s failure to defend and indemnify Transco
with respect to the tort lawsuit brought by APS’s employee was arbitrary
and capricious.85 Resolution of the suit turned on whether the LOIA
applied to the agreement. If the LOIA did not apply, then Transco was
entitled to defense and indemnity for the tort lawsuit.86 If, however, the
LOIA did apply, then the provision requiring APS to name Transco as an
additional insured would be void pursuant to subsection G.87 Relying on
the language of subsection C, the Fifth Circuit stated that in order for the
LOIA to apply the agreement must (1) pertain to a well and (2) be related
to the exploration, development, production, or transportation of oil, gas,
or water.88 The Transcontinental court also articulated a 10-factor test for
determining when an agreement “pertains to a well”:
(1) whether the structures or facilities to which the contract applies
or with which it is associated . . . are part of an in-field gasgathering system; (2) what is the geographical location of the
facility or system relative to the well or wells; . . . (7) what is the
purpose or function of the facility or structure in question; . . . (9)
who owns and operates the facility or structure in question, and
who owns and operates the well or wells that produce the [oil or]
gas in question; (10) and any number of other details affecting the
functional and geographic nexus between “a well” and the
structure or facility that is the object of the agreement under
scrutiny.89

84. Id.
85. Id. “Outer Continental Shelf,” as defined in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, means “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of
lands beneath navigable waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain
to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (2018).
86. See generally Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 985.
87. See generally id.
88. Id. at 991.
89. Id. at 995. Factors three, four, five, six, and eight are only relevant when
the services provided for in the contract under scrutiny are related to natural gas
transmission systems, like the one at issue in Transcontinental. Id. Courts have
applied the modified five-factor Transcontinental test in cases involving oil and
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The court ultimately concluded that it did not have enough information
to determine the applicability of the LOIA and remanded the case to the
district court.90
Courts applying the two-prong Transcontinental test have placed the
most emphasis on, and have broadly construed, the first prong.91 The
second prong of the Transcontinental test has not faced much scrutiny in
the courts because if the agreement pertains to a well, it most likely is
related to the exploration, development, production, or transportation of
oil, gas, or water.92 Because of both the broad definition of the term
“agreement” contained in the statute, and the broad interpretation accorded
by the judiciary, the LOIA can apply to virtually any contract in Louisiana
related to oil and gas services.93
In Broussard v. Conoco, Inc., the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the application of the LOIA to a contract for catering services
between Conoco, Inc. (Conoco) and SHRM Catering Services, Inc.
(SHRM).94 Oliver Broussard fell from a stool while changing the sheets
on a bunk bed and subsequently brought suit against Conoco for
negligence.95 Broussard sustained his injuries while working on a living
quarters platform on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana
in the course of his employment with SHRM.96 The platform involved did
not house any oilfield-related equipment; the platform merely contained
sleeping quarters and a cafeteria for the offshore workers.97 The court
found that the purpose of the living quarters platform was to sustain
manpower for production and that the LOIA therefore applied, because the
contract pertained to a well and was related to the production of oil.98
Transcontinental and Broussard demonstrate that courts in Louisiana
have interpreted the scope of the LOIA broadly.99 When offshore
operations are involved, before a court can determine whether the LOIA
gas platforms and related structures. See Broussard v. Conoco, Inc., 959 F.2d 42
(5th Cir 1992).
90. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d at 994–96.
91. Adams & Milhollin, supra note 64, at 91.
92. Id. at 92.
93. Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1099–1100.
94. Broussard, 959 F.2d at 43.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 44.
97. Id. at 43–44.
98. Id. at 45.
99. See, e.g., Livings v. Serv. Truck Lines of Tex., Inc., 467 So. 2d 595 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985); see also Fuselier v. Amoco Prod. Co., 546 So. 2d 306 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1317 (La. 1989).
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will apply to an agreement, it must first determine that state law, as
opposed to federal maritime law, governs the agreement.100
D. When Indemnity Suits Arise Offshore—the “Amphibious Multiparty
Donnybrook”101
Courts have to labor through additional steps in resolving indemnity
claims and applying anti-indemnity statutes when offshore operations are
involved.102 Extensive maritime activity occurs off the coast of Louisiana,
and maritime activity has close ties to the oil and gas industry.103 This
relationship creates a complexity for courts and parties in determining
whether the law requires that the court either uphold or strike an indemnity
provision in a contract.104 First, the court must determine whether the
offshore contract is maritime or non-maritime.105 This determination
dictates whether federal maritime law or state law—and state antiindemnity statutes—will apply to the contract.106 If the contract is
maritime, courts will generally allow an indemnitee to be indemnified for
his own fault or negligence, subject to some limitations which are outside
the scope of this Comment.107 If the contract is non-maritime, and thus
governed by Louisiana law and subject to the LOIA, the indemnitee cannot
obtain indemnity for his own negligence or fault if the “‘agreement’
pertains to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals.”108
Second, and further complicating the analysis of indemnity in offshore
oil and gas contracts, is the intersection of state law and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).109 For the LOIA to apply to a nonmaritime contract that governs offshore oil and gas operations on the outer
continental shelf, Louisiana law must apply as “surrogate federal law”
through the OCSLA.110 The OCSLA declares that federal law,
100. Shilliday et al., supra note 70.
101. Roberts v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 648 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1981)
(using this phrase to describe the typical offshore case.)
102. Id.; Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1986).
103. Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1123.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Fontenot v. Sw. Offshore Corp., 771 So. 2d 679, 682 (La. Ct. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 773 So. 2d 144 (La. 2000).
107. Id.
108. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(B) (2018); id. § 9:2780(C).
109. See generally Adams & Milhollin, supra note 64, at 52.
110. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2018).
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incorporating the law of the adjacent state, applies to fixed structures on
the outer continental shelf.111 Section 1333(a)(1) of the OCSLA declares:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of
the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all
installations and other devices permanently or temporarily
attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the
purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom . . . .112
Furthermore, the OCSLA provides that the law of the adjacent state
shall apply as surrogate federal law to structures permanently affixed to
the subsoil or seabed of the outer continental shelf, but only when the law
of the adjacent state is not inconsistent with federal law.113
The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Union Texas Petroleum
Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., set forth the following three-factor test—
the UTP test—for determining whether state law will apply as surrogate
federal law on the outer continental shelf through the OCSLA: (1) the
controversy must arise on an OCSLA situs;114 (2) federal maritime law
must not apply; and (3) state law must not be inconsistent with federal
law.115
As to the first factor of the UTP test, a contractual indemnity claim
arises on an OCSLA situs, such as the subsoil, seabed, or other artificial
structures permanently or temporarily attached thereto, if the contract
requires that the majority of the work be performed on stationary platforms
or other situses listed in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a).116
With respect to the second factor of the UTP test, to determine whether
maritime law applies, the court must inquire into whether the contract at

111. Adams & Milhollin, supra note 64, at 52.
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).
113. Id. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (“To the extent that they are applicable and not
inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal . . . the civil and criminal
laws of each adjacent State . . . are declared to be the law of the United States for
that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial
islands and fixed structures erected thereon.”).
114. A situs is “[t]he location or position (of something) for legal purposes.”
Situs, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
115. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047
(5th Cir. 1990) (citing Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355–56
(1969)).
116. ACE Am. Ins. v. M-I, L.L.C., 699 F.3d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 2012).
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issue is maritime in nature.117 In In re Larry Doiron, Inc., the U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals established the following dual-inquiry test to
determine whether a contract in the oil and gas context is maritime: first,
whether the contract is one to provide services to facilitate the drilling or
production of oil or gas on navigable waters; and second, whether the
parties expect that a vessel will play a substantial role in the completion of
the contract.118 If the answer to both inquiries is “yes,” then the contract is
maritime.119 This test places central focus on the contract and the parties’
expectations, which the Doiron court noted is the proper approach in a
contract dispute.120 The court in Doiron favored this approach because it
assists the parties in evaluating their risks and liabilities under indemnity
clauses in their MSAs.121
As to the third factor of the UTP test, courts have repeatedly held that
the LOIA is not inconsistent with federal law.122
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Grand Isle Shipyard v. Seacor Marine
demonstrates the application of the LOIA through the OCSLA to a
controversy arising on the outer continental shelf.123 The suit arose out of
an indemnity dispute between two contractors of British Petroleum
(BP).124 BP, the owner of the platform, entered into a contract with Grand
Isle Shipyard Inc. (Grand Isle) whereby Grand Isle agreed to perform
certain construction work on the platform.125 The contract between BP and
Seacor Marine, LLC (Seacor) provided that Seacor would transport
workers for BP and BP’s contractors.126 The BP-Grand Isle contract
contained a provision requiring Grand Isle to defend and indemnify BP
and its contractors for injuries sustained by Grand Isle employees.127 The
BP-Seacor contract also contained an indemnity provision in favor of BP
and BP’s other contractors in the event of an injury to one of Seacor’s
employees.128 The undisputed objective of these indemnity provisions was
117. Id. at 831.
118. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2018).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 789 (5th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512, 1529 (5th Cir.
1996)).
123. See generally id. at 778.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 781.
127. Id. at 782.
128. Id.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 380

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

COMMENT

1053

for each contractor whose employee was injured to hold harmless and
indemnify BP and BP’s other contractors for liability resulting from
injuries to or the death of that employee.129
The controversy arose when Danny Neil, an employee of Grand Isle,
was injured while being transported on a vessel owned by Seacor from the
stationary platform where he worked to the platform containing his living
quarters.130 Neil sued Seacor for negligence, and Seacor sought indemnity
from Grand Isle.131 Thereafter, Grand Isle filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.132 Grand Isle sought a
declaratory judgment133 recognizing that it did not owe defense,
indemnity, or insurance coverage to Seacor on the basis that the LOIA,
which applied by virtue of the OCSLA, rendered such provisions
invalid.134 Seacor filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking a
determination that the indemnity provisions were enforceable because
general maritime law applied.135
The court stated that the issue was whether the law of the adjacent
State of Louisiana, including the LOIA, applied to the case.136 The parties
agreed that if the LOIA applied, it would invalidate Grand Isle’s indemnity
obligation to Seacor.137 If the LOIA did not apply, the indemnity
agreement would be enforceable.138 In order to resolve the issue, the court
had to determine the applicability of the OCLSA and, more specifically,
the situs of the controversy that gave rise to the lawsuit.139 The court stated
that the situs of the underlying tort which prompts the contractual
indemnity dispute does not determine the situs of the contract dispute.140
In contract disputes that are triggered by an underlying tort claim, the
location of the majority of the performance called for under the contract
129. Id.
130. Id. at 781.
131. Id. at 782.
132. Id. at 783.
133. A declaratory judgment is a “binding adjudication that establishes the
rights and other legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering
enforcement. Declaratory judgments are often sought, for example, by insurance
companies in determining whether a policy covers a given insured or peril.”
Declaratory judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
134. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., 589 F.3d at 782.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 783–84.
140. Id. at 784; see also In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 576 n.51 (5th
Cir. 2018).
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determines the situs requirement.141 If that location consists of stationary
platforms or other situses enumerated in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A), then
the matter arises on an OCSLA situs.142 Thus, the court held that the LOIA
applied to the suit by virtue of the OCSLA, and the LOIA nullified the
indemnity provision.143
In justifying its focus-of-the-contract test for determining the situs in
contractual indemnity disputes, the court cited “predictability and stability
in allocating risk.”144 The court noted that the “[t]ort-situs approach
prevents commercial parties from reliably allocating risk in their
contractual arrangements because they have no way of predicting where
‘controversies’ might arise and thus no way of knowing which law will
govern.”145
The Fifth Circuit noted—in Grand Isle and in In re Larry Doiron—
that predictability in risk evaluation and in risk allocation is vitally
important; however, under the LOIA and the case law interpreting the
Marcel exception, parties cannot predictably allocate risk in oilfield
contracts.146 The Louisiana Legislature rejected a regardless-of-fault riskallocation scheme under the LOIA; indemnity provisions are void under
the LOIA “only to the extent that they purport to require
indemnification . . . where there is negligence or fault on the part of the
indemnitee; otherwise, they are enforceable as any other legal
covenant.”147 A court can only make the determination that the LOIA
voids the indemnity provision after it decides whether the indemnitee was
or was not negligent or at fault in causing injury.148 The need to make a
preliminary determination regarding the negligence or fault of the
indemnitee leads to uncertain risk-allocation outcomes, thereby
undermining certain benefits of risk allocation—namely, predictability
and preclusion of certain disputes concerning fault.149 Parties can better
realize the benefits of risk allocation if they are permitted to undertake

141. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., 589 F.3d at 787.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See generally Panagiotis, supra note 10; Pugh, supra note 27.
147. Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 838 (La. 1987).
148. Id. at 835.
149. See generally Cary A. Moomjian, Contractual Insurance and Risk
Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, Jan./Feb.
1999, at 19, available at http://www.iadc.org/dcpi/dc-janfeb99/j-cary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48RB-GMH7].
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regardless-of-fault indemnity.150 Additionally, relying solely on the
Marcel exception to the LOIA, parties are further hindered in achieving
the stability and predictability that risk allocation is intended to provide.151
II. RELYING ON THE MARCEL EXCEPTION TO SATISFY RISK-ALLOCATION
NEEDS: A RISK IN ITSELF
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that parties need to be able to rely
upon the risk-allocation provisions in their contracts, emphasizing the
importance of predictability in risk allocation.152 In Grand Isle, the Fifth
Circuit justified its holding by stating that the focus-of-the-contract test
provides parties with certainty regarding their risk-allocation
arrangements.153 Louisiana law voids all regardless-of-fault risk-allocation
schemes in agreements that “pertain to a well”; Marcel coverage provides
the only exception to this rule.154 The above-referenced statement from the
Fifth Circuit in Grand Isle regarding the importance of certainty in riskallocation agreements conflicts with the obscure state of the case law
addressing the Marcel exception—the only method by which parties may
allocate risk on a regardless-of-fault basis in Louisiana oilfield
contracts.155 Courts have created ambiguities with respect to compliance
with the requirements of falling within the Marcel exception, causing
challenges for parties obtaining and relying upon Marcel coverage.156
Moreover, recent case law demonstrates that, even when parties have
obtained Marcel coverage, it is unclear exactly the extent of the coverage

150. See generally id.
151. See generally Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
152. See generally Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d
778 (5th Cir. 2009).
153. Id. at 787.
154. Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1120 (stating that the “oil companies, short of
purchasing insurance policies for each individual well site, are, under the LOIA,
specifically prevented from protecting themselves from the liability exposure
arising in oil exploration”).
155. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
156. See Rogers v. Samedan Oil Co., 308 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002); Hodgen v.
Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512, 1529 (5th Cir. 1997); Amoco Prod. Co. COGEPCO, Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington Ins., 745 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1999).
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secured.157 It is clear, however, that the Marcel exception does allow
parties some freedom to allocate risks.158
A. The Birth of Marcel
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
established the Marcel exception to the LOIA in Patterson v. Conoco,
Inc.159 Armando Patterson sustained injuries while working on a fixed
platform off the coast of Louisiana on the outer continental shelf.160 At the
time he was injured, Patterson was working for J. Lee Boyle & Associates,
Inc.161 Patterson filed suit against Conoco, the owner of the platform, as
well as E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Company and National Union Fire
Insurance Company.162 Dupont filed a third-party claim against Boyle
seeking tort and contractual indemnification.163 The court dismissed
Dupont’s tort indemnity claim on the basis of workers’ compensation.164
Boyle and Dupont’s agreement contained an indemnity provision
requiring Boyle to fully indemnify Dupont against any losses and expenses
arising out of injury to any person on a regardless-of-fault basis.165
Applying the LOIA to the indemnity agreement, the court struck the
indemnity provisions in the contract and dismissed Dupont’s third-party
157. See Borman v. Shamrock Energy Sols., LLC, No. 17-11720, 2019 WL
4930231, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2019); Durr v. GOL, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 476
(E.D. La. 2019); Jefferson v. Int’l Marine, LLC, 224 So. 3d 50, 55 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2017).
158. See generally Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1129.
159. Patterson v. Conoco, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. La. 1987).
160. Id. at 183.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901–50, with few exceptions, provides that the employer’s liability to an
injured employee shall be limited to payment of compensation as provided under
the Longshore Act, thereby extinguishing any tort liability on the part of an
LHWCA-covered employer to its injured employee. See id. § 905(a). Hence, no
tort liability exists to support a third-party tortfeasor’s tort indemnity or tort
contribution claims against the covered-LHWCA employer. See Ketchum v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 789 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1986).
165. Patterson, 670 F. Supp. at 183. The specific language contained in the
indemnity provision provided that “Boyle agrees to indemnify fully Dupont
against all losses and expenses resulting from injury to any person resulting in any
way from any act or omission, negligent or otherwise, on the part of Dupont or
Boyle.” Id.
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claim for indemnity.166 The court applied LOIA subsection B, which
prohibits indemnity for losses arising out of the negligence or fault of the
indemnitee, and voided the indemnity provision.167 The agreement
between the parties also provided that Boyle would obtain liability
insurance coverage for the contract work and name Dupont as a coinsured.168 Normally, such an agreement would violate Subsection G of
the LOIA because it requires one party to obtain insurance to protect the
other from the consequences of his own negligence or fault.169 In this case,
however, Dupont submitted evidence showing that Dupont had
reimbursed Boyle for the costs of the insurance premium associated with
extending coverage to Dupont.170 The court found that the LOIA did not
require dismissal of Dupont’s claim for insurance coverage since Dupont
proved that it paid for its additional insured coverage.171 As the LOIA
prevents the shifting of the economic burden of the oil company’s
negligence onto the independent contractor, the agreement did not violate
the LOIA because the indemnitee did not shift the economic burden of its
fault onto the indemnitor.172
In Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., the Fifth Circuit adopted the Patterson
court’s approach, giving rise to the well-known Marcel exception.173 In
Marcel, Jeffrey Marcel sustained injuries while working on a fixed
platform on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana.174 SEE,
Inc. employed Marcel, and Placid Oil Company operated the platform on
which Marcel allegedly slipped on a puddle of oil and sustained injuries.175
The agreement between SEE and Placid provided that SEE would obtain
insurance indemnifying Placid, name Placid as an insured, and bill Placid
directly for its share of the insurance premiums.176 Marcel sued Placid for
negligence in connection with the injuries he sustained.177 Placid
subsequently filed a third-party claim against SEE for breach of contract,
arguing that SEE failed to obtain insurance coverage on behalf of Placid

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(B) (2018).
Patterson, 670 F. Supp. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 565.
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as provided in the agreement.178 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of SEE and, in dismissing Placid’s claims, held that a
provision which obligates a party to obtain insurance in favor of another
violates subsection G of the LOIA.179 Placid, however, appealed this ruling
on the basis of the holding in Patterson v. Conoco, Inc.180
The Fifth Circuit adopted the exception carved out in Patterson, which
provides that a party may obtain the status of additional insured through
its contractor’s insurance policy when it pays for the coverage.181 The
court reasoned that the purpose of the LOIA is to prevent an oil company
from shifting the economic costs associated with the its own negligence
onto its contractor.182 When the oil company pays the cost of being named
as an additional insured on the contractor’s policy, the economic burden
associated with the oil company’s negligence is not shifted onto the
contractor.183 Such an arrangement does not violate the policy behind the
LOIA.184 The court stressed that this exception only applies if the principal
pays the “material part” of the premium associated with the additional
insured endorsement.185 Marcel stands for the proposition that the LOIA
does not prohibit an oil company from obtaining additional insured
coverage through its contractor’s insurance policy, provided that the oil
company pays its fair share for that coverage.186 Therefore, when an
agreement is not contrary to the policy considerations that prompted the
enactment of the LOIA, the court will not void the agreement.187 The
Marcel exception, however, provides parties with a less-than-ideal riskallocation arrangement.188 Parties struggle to comply with the
requirements for obtaining Marcel coverage, and when parties comply
with the Marcel exception, they struggle to determine what exactly they
are receiving.189
It is clear that the Marcel exception allows the oil company to obtain
additional insured status on its contractor’s policy, which permits the oil
company to obtain indemnity from the contractor’s insurer if the oil
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 566; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 9:278(G) (2018).
Marcel, 11 F.3d at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 570.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
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company is sued in tort by an injured employee of the contractor.190 Courts
and practitioners alike have historically considered additional insured
endorsements to be a legitimate method of risk allocation.191 Under the
LOIA, obtaining additional insured coverage through the Marcel
exception is the only option parties have to allocate risks without first
determining that the indemnitee is free from fault.192 Risk allocation is
especially important in exploration and production activities because of
the high probability of loss inherent in the hazardous nature of the work.193
The production of oil and gas poses significant risks to safety and human
health, as oil field workers face serious risks of bodily injury during dayto-day operations.194 This increased likelihood of personal injury leads to
an increased likelihood of personal injury lawsuits.195 When a contractor’s
employee sustains injuries on the job, the employee may not sue his
employer, pursuant to the governing workers’ compensation scheme.196
The injured employee can, however, sue the oil company and any thirdparty contractors.197 Thus, oil companies expose themselves to the risk of
liability for the injuries of their contractor’s employees when hiring
various contractors.198 Oil companies secure themselves from this
exposure through the Marcel exception, which permits additional insured
endorsements and allows the oil company to be indemnified for losses

190. See, e.g., Patterson v. Conoco, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. La. 1987).
Patterson, an employee of Boyle, was injured and sued Dupont in tort. Thereafter,
Dupont sued Boyle for indemnification pursuant to its additional insured status
on Boyle’s insurance policy. Id. This is a typical example of how a lawsuit
alleging a right to Marcel coverage arises.
191. Trisha Strode, Comment, From the Bottom of the Food Chain Looking
Up: Subcontractors Are Finding That Additional Insured Endorsements Are
Giving Them Much More Than They Bargained For, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
697, 703 (2004).
192. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780 (2018); Marcel, 11 F.3d 563; see
also Kehoe, supra note 13.
193. See generally Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
194. Knapp v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting
that “[i]t is universally known that the exploration for oil, gas and other minerals
is extremely hazardous”).
195. See generally Strode, supra note 191.
196. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032(A); see also 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018).
197. See, e.g., Patterson v. Conoco, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 182 (W.D. La. 1987).
198. Strode, supra note 191, at 704. The original rationale for this practice was
that each party should be responsible for its own employees as the entity with the
most control over its own employees and the daily operations relating to their
work.
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arising out of its negligence or fault.199 For the oil company to benefit from
the Marcel exception, they must accurately ensure that they have complied
with Marcel’s requirements, namely, paying the “material part” of the
premium.200
B. Rejection of Claims for Marcel Coverage on the Basis of a Failure to
Pay the “Material Part” of the Premium
As the Fifth Circuit set forth in Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., the oil
company must pay the “material part” of the premium in order for the
exception to apply.201 The following cases demonstrate that the
requirement of paying the “material part” is rife with ambiguity.202 This
ambiguity has left parties unable to obtain the Marcel coverage that they
have contracted for and relied upon in drafting their agreements.203
1. The Contractor May Not Factor the Cost of the Additional Insured
Coverage into the Price Charged to the Oil Company
The Fifth Circuit rejected an operator’s claim to Marcel coverage in
Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp.204 Based on the non-maritime nature of the
contract, the LOIA governed the contract between Forest Oil Corp. and
Operators and Consulting Services, Inc. (OCS).205 Forest asserted a right
to Marcel coverage under the insurance policy obtained by OCS.206 Forest
argued that it paid the Marcel premium pursuant to its company practice
which permitted its contractors, like OCS, to factor the cost of naming
Forest as an additional insured into its contract price.207 The court refused
to find that this agreement fell within the Marcel exception, reasoning that
allowing an oil company to satisfy the requirement of paying the “material
part” of the premium by permitting the contractor to factor the cost into
the price charged to the operator would undermine the LOIA.208 If courts
199. See generally Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
200. See generally id.
201. See generally id.
202. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2.
203. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2.
204. Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d 1512 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled on
other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778
(5th Cir. 2009).
205. Id. at 1526–27.
206. Id. at 1529.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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were to permit this arrangement, every oil company would claim a right to
Marcel coverage by virtue of the contractor having factored in the cost of
paying the “material part” of the premium into the price charged to the oil
company for its services.209 The oil company must actually be able to
present proof that it paid the “material part” of the coverage so that the
Marcel exception does not effectively write out subsection G of the LOIA
from the statute.210 Subsequent case law has not clarified what constitutes
sufficient proof of payment of the “material part” of the Marcel
premium.211
2. The $2,000 Question—a Comparison of Amoco and Rogers
Louisiana state courts and federal courts applying Louisiana law have
accorded different interpretations to what constitutes the “material part”
of the premium.212 In Amoco Production Co. COG-EPCO, Ltd.
Partnership v. Lexington Insurance Co., the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal addressed the question of whether Amoco Production Co. paid
the “material part” of the premium associated with the additional insured
endorsement made in Amoco’s favor.213 Amoco entered into an MSA with
Pride Petroleum Services, a workover contractor, in which Pride agreed to
perform workover services on one of Amoco’s wells in Point Coupee
Parish, Louisiana.214 Pride added Amoco as an additional insured under
Pride’s primary and excess insurance policies.215 The court noted that it
was undisputed that the total increase in the premium associated with the
additional insured endorsement was $2,000 and that Amoco paid the
$2,000.216 Lexington Insurance Co. provided Pride’s insurance
coverage.217 One Pride employee was killed and several others were
209. See generally id.
210. See generally id.
211. See Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington Ins.,
745 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999); cf. Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp.,
308 F.3d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2002).
212. See Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship, 745 So. 2d 676.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 677.
215. Id. at 678.
216. Id. Amoco tried to argue that the LOIA should not apply because Pride
was not the type of “mom and pop” oil service company that the LOIA was aimed
at protecting. Amoco cited the fact that Pride had purchased 85 times the amount
of coverage required under their agreement. The court rejected this argument and
struck the coverage in the name of preserving fairness of competition among
Louisiana contractors. Id. at 680.
217. Id. at 678.
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seriously injured when an explosion occurred at the wellsite.218 As a result,
numerous survivors brought suit against Amoco.219
Lexington rejected Amoco’s claims for coverage under the Pride
policy, citing the LOIA as justification for the rejection.220 Amoco argued
that Pride, an international company performing work all over the world,
was not the type of “mom and pop” contractor that the LOIA was enacted
to protect and that the LOIA, therefore, should not apply.221 The court
rejected Amoco’s argument that the LOIA should not apply.222 The court
reasoned that applying the LOIA to void coverage in this case would serve
to promote the purpose of the LOIA by preventing oil companies from
forcing contractors to purchase insurance to cover the oil company’s
negligence, thereby preserving fairness of competition among
contractors.223 The court found that the $2,000 paid by Amoco for nearly
$11,000,000 in coverage provided under the Lexington policy was
“insufficient consideration.”224 Amoco failed to prove that it paid the
“material part” of the cost of coverage; therefore, the Marcel exception did
not apply.225 Thus, the additional insured endorsement was held
unenforceable pursuant to subsection G of the LOIA.226
The court rejected Amoco’s argument that Pride purchased more than
85 times the amount of insurance required under the MSA, and Amoco
asserted that Pride would have needed that coverage for its operations in
other states even in the absence of its contract with Amoco.227 It remains
unclear what would have been a sufficient amount of money for the
majority to find that the “material part” of the premium was paid, as
Amoco did in fact pay the entire cost of the additional insured
endorsement.228
In Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., a successful claim to Marcel
coverage was made and subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.229 Charles Rogers was working for Pride Petroleum
Services—Samedan Oil Corporation’s contractor—at the time he
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
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Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680–81.
Id.
Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(G) (2018).
Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship, 745 So. 2d at 680.
See generally id.
Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002).
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sustained injuries.230 Pride named Samedan as an additional insured on the
insurance policy that Pride obtained from Lexington Insurance Co.231
Lexington charged Samedan $2,000 per year for the additional insured
endorsement, and Samedan paid these premiums directly to Lexington.232
Moreover, the amount of liability coverage available to Samedan under
the policy was $11,000,000.233 Charles Rogers filed a personal injury
lawsuit against Samedan, which it eventually settled with Rogers.234
Samedan filed a third-party claim against Lexington for reimbursement of
settlement costs paid to Rogers pursuant to the additional insured
endorsement on Pride’s insurance policy.235 Despite the factual similarities
between Rogers and Amoco, the Fifth Circuit in Rogers entered a holding
directly contrary to that entered by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal in Amoco.236 The Fifth Circuit found that Pride had not borne the
“material part” of the premium associated with Samedan’s additional
insured endorsement on Pride’s insurance policy.237 Moreover, the court
found that Samedan paid the entire part of the premium for its additional
insured coverage.238 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the Marcel
exception applied and that the arrangement did not violate the LOIA.239
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Amoco from Rogers based on the fact
that Lexington set the premiums and that Samedan paid these premiums
directly to Lexington.240 Amoco did, however, pay the premium for its
additional insured endorsement, and it is not clear from the Amoco opinion
whether Amoco made the payment to Pride or Lexington.241 The minor
factual distinction between Rogers and Amoco resulted in diametrically
opposed outcomes, creating further ambiguity surrounding what

230. Id. at 479.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 480.
233. Id. at 479.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id.; cf. Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship v. Lexington
Ins. Co., 745 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
237. Rogers, 308 F.3d at 479.
238. Id. at 482.
239. Id.
240. Id. Skeptics might make the distinction based upon the fact that Amoco
involved a Louisiana state court, and Rogers involved a federal district court.
241. Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd. P’ship, 745 So. 2d at 678.
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constitutes the “material part” of the premium.242 This ambiguity leaves
parties with a lack of predictability in their risk-allocation agreements.243
In the context of multimillion-dollar exploration and production
projects, predictability of risk allocation is extremely important, especially
given the dangerous work environment and the likelihood of personal
injury lawsuits.244 In fact, the main purposes of allocating risk are to
achieve predictability and avoid the uncertainties and costs that follow
from making determinations of fault and causation.245 From the preceding
three cases, at least one thing is clear: the operator must make a showing
that it actually paid the “material part” of the premium associated with its
additional insured endorsement.246 The boundaries of the Marcel
exception are even less clear when the contractor’s insurance policy names
third parties to the MSA as additional insureds.247
C. The Extension of Marcel Coverage to Third Parties
A recent issue that has surfaced in several cases is whether Marcel
coverage extends to third-party contractors who do not pay a Marcel
premium. The controversy in Jefferson v. International Marine, LLC arose
when Robert Jefferson, an employee of General Fabricators, Inc., fell into
a hole caused by a missing deck board on International Marine LLC’s
vessel while being transported to McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC’s platform
off the coast of Louisiana.248 International entered into an agreement with
McMoRan, the principal, to provide certain vessel services in connection
with McMoRan’s offshore project.249 General also contracted with
McMoRan to provide services as a subcontractor on McMoRan’s offshore
drilling platform.250 Pursuant to the contract, General agreed to name
McMoRan as an additional insured under General’s insurance policy.251
242. See generally id.; Rogers, 308 F.3d 477.
243. See Rogers, 308 F.3d 477; cf. Amoco Prod. Co. COG-EPCO 1992 Ltd.
P’ship,745 So. 2d 676.
244. See generally Pugh, supra note 27; Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6, at
§ 6.03.
245. See generally Pugh, supra note 27; Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6, at
§ 6.03.
246. See generally Pugh, supra note 27; Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6, at
§ 6.03.
247. See discussion infra Part II.C.
248. Jefferson v. Int’l Marine, LLC, 224 So. 3d 50, 51–52 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2017).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 52.
251. Id.
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McMoRan stipulated that it would pay the premium in order to fit within
the Marcel exception to the LOIA; however, McMoRan failed to pay the
Marcel premium.252 Jefferson sued International, and International filed a
third-party claim against McMoRan, alleging, inter alia, that McMoRan’s
failure to pay the Marcel premium caused International to lose its right of
indemnity from General.253
International argued that, as an invitee of McMoRan under the
contract between McMoRan and General, it had a right to indemnity from
General.254 McMoRan’s failure to pay the premium, however, caused
International to lose that right.255 The court held that McMoRan had no
obligation to purchase Marcel coverage under General’s policy to protect
International from claims by General’s employees.256 Thus, International
did not lose a right to indemnity from General because International could
not lose a right it never had.257 The court, without explanation, stated in
dicta that the Marcel coverage does not extend to third-party beneficiaries,
like International, who have not paid a Marcel premium.258
Two recent cases from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana have provided a more substantial analysis of whether third
parties are entitled to Marcel coverage.259 The first case is Borman v.
Shamrock Energy Solutions, LLC, in which the court addressed a thirdparty contractor’s claim to Marcel coverage.260 Plaintiff Garland Borman
sustained injuries during the course of his employment with Linear
Controls, Inc. while working aboard an offshore platform on the outer
continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana.261 Fieldwood Energy owned
the platform.262 At the time of the accident, Shamrock Energy Solutions,
252. Id. Although the court did not address this specific issue, due to
McMoRan’s failure to pay the increased cost associated with its addition to
General’s policy, the provision in the McMoRan-General contract requiring
General to name McMoRan as an additional insured was void under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:2780(G). See Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 570 (5th
Cir. 1994).
253. Jefferson, 224 So. 3d at 54.
254. Id. at 52–53.
255. Id. at 52.
256. Id. at 55.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Borman v. Shamrock Energy Sols., LLC, 421 F. Supp. 3d 382 (E.D.
La. 2019); Durr v. GOL, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 476 (E.D. La. 2019).
260. Borman, 421 F. Supp. 3d at 384.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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LLC also had employees working on the Fieldwood platform.263 Both
Shamrock and Linear had each individually entered into MSAs with
Fieldwood that obligated each to obtain Marcel coverage in favor of
Fieldwood; however, Shamrock and Linear were not in privity of contract
with one another.264
Borman filed a negligence lawsuit against Shamrock and
Fieldwood.265 Shamrock thereafter filed a third-party claim against Linear
and Linear’s insurer, First Mercury Insurance Company (FMIC), alleging,
inter alia, that Shamrock was entitled to Marcel coverage under Linear’s
insurance policy pursuant to the Linear-Fieldwood MSA.266 Shamrock
moved for summary judgment on this specific issue.267 Linear and FMIC,
in opposition to Shamrock’s motion, argued that the principal’s payment
of the Marcel premium was insufficient to extend the Marcel coverage to
a third party, like Shamrock, who had neither paid nor contributed to
payment of the Marcel premium.268 Shamrock argued that the Marcel
exception does not require that the party seeking coverage pay the Marcel
premium when the principal has paid the entire Marcel premium, and no
portion of the Marcel premium was borne by the independent contractor
that procures the coverage.269 The court held first that Shamrock was an
invitee and was therefore part of Fieldwood’s company group270 for
insurance indemnification purposes.271 The court noted that neither the
Louisiana Supreme Court nor the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
directly addressed whether a third-party contractor within a company
group is entitled to Marcel coverage when the principal pays the Marcel
premium on behalf of itself and the company group.272 It was undisputed
that Fieldwood, the principal, paid the entirety of the “material part” of the
Marcel premium on behalf of itself and the company group.273 Since
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 385.
269. Id. at 386. “Fieldwood is the principal or company. Shamrock is the thirdparty contractor or indemnitee. Linear is the indemnitor,” or the party who
procured the insurance coverage. Id. at 386 n.3.
270. “The Company Group is defined as ‘[Fieldwood] and its parent, affiliates
and subsidiary companies, co-lessees, co-owners, partners, joint venturers,
together with its and all of their respective officers, directors, employees, in-house
legal counsel, agents, representatives, insurers and invitees.’” Id. at 387.
271. Id. at 388.
272. Id. at 389.
273. Id. at 390.
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Fieldwood, and not Linear, bore the increased costs of procuring the
Marcel coverage for Fieldwood and its company group, Fieldwood did not
shift the economic burden of its negligence or fault upon Linear.274
Relying on the two underlying policy goals of the Marcel exception and
the LOIA—promoting the acquisition of insurance for accidents occurring
on offshore platforms while preventing the shifting of the economic
burden of insurance coverage to the indemnitor—the court found that
application of the Marcel exception to this case was appropriate.275 Thus,
the court held that the agreement did not violate the purpose of the LOIA
and the Marcel exception.276 Shamrock prevailed on its motion for
summary judgment.277
In the second case, Dur v. Gol, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana addressed a motion to dismiss which raised
the issue of whether the principal’s payment of the Marcel premium
extends additional insured coverage under the contractor’s insurance
policy to the principal’s other contractors.278 Terry Durr, an employee of
Linear Control, Inc., was injured while being transported via a vessel to a
fixed platform owned by Fieldwood Energy, located on the outer
continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana where he worked.279 Fieldwood
paid the Marcel premium to obtain additional insured coverage on
Linear’s policy.280 At the time of Durr’s injuries, Linear was working as a
contractor for Fieldwood.281 Pursuant to an MSA between Fieldwood and
the Wood Group PSN, Inc., Wood Group was also working as a contractor
for Fieldwood at the time of Durr’s injuries.282 Durr sued Wood Group,
Fieldwood, and others for his injuries, alleging that their negligence
contributed to his injuries.283 Wood Group filed a third-party claim against
Linear and its insurer, First Mercury Insurance Company (FMIC),
alleging, inter alia, that it was entitled to Marcel coverage under Linear’s
insurance policy as an additional insured.284 Wood Group argued that the
Linear-Fieldwood contract required Linear to obtain insurance coverage
for the benefit of the company group, which by definition included Wood
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
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Durr v. GOL, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 476 (E.D. La. 2019).
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480–81.
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Id. at 480.
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Group.285 It was undisputed that Fieldwood paid the cost of the premium
associated with the additional insured endorsement and that Linear did not
bear any portion of the cost.286 Moreover, it was undisputed that the
Linear-Fieldwood MSA required Linear to obtain Marcel coverage for
Fieldwood and Fieldwood’s company group, of which Wood Group was
a member.287 The court denied Linear’s motion to dismiss and held that
Wood Group stated a plausible claim that it is a member of Fieldwood’s
company group that is entitled to benefit from Fieldwood’s payment of the
Marcel premium.288
At first blush, it does not seem that extending Marcel coverage to third
parties would violate the policy behind the LOIA and the Marcel
exception.289 The justification of the Marcel exception to the LOIA is that
the oil company is not impermissibly shifting the economic burden of its
fault or negligence onto the contractor.290 Marcel stands for the
proposition that when the oil company pays the cost of the increased
premium associated with being named as an additional insured on the
contractor’s policy, the oil company does not violate the LOIA because
there is no impermissible economic burden-shifting.291 This exception
does not apply where the contractor pays any part of this increased
premium because that would amount to impermissible burden-shifting.292
The preceding three cases addressed the attempts of parties to extend
Marcel coverage to third-party contractors; however, the courts have
provided no definite answer as to whether this arrangement comports with
the policy behind the LOIA.293
Parties have attempted to accomplish this extension of coverage by
naming the whole company group as an additional insured on the
contractor’s policy, and having the oil company pay the entire cost
285. Id. at 480–81.
286. Id. at 486.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 488–89. The court noted that Linear had paid no cost of the Marcel
premium because the Marcel premium was paid in full by Fieldwood on behalf
of Fieldwood and the company group. The court stated that this arrangement was
consistent with the public policy behind the LOIA and the Marcel exception. Id.
289. See generally id.
290. Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1994).
291. See id. at 569–70; Patterson v. Conoco, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 182, 184 (W.D.
La. 1987).
292. Marcel, 11 F.3d at 570.
293. Jefferson v. Int’l Marine, LLC, 224 So. 3d 50 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017);
Borman v. Shamrock Energy Sols., LLC, No. 17-11720, 2019 WL 4930231, at
*1 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2019); Durr, 393 F. Supp. 3d 476.
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associated with the increased premium in favor of itself and the company
group.294 Courts could find that extending Marcel coverage to third-party
members of the company group is consistent with the LOIA and the
Marcel exception when the contractor procuring the coverage does not pay
any part of the increased premium associated with the additional insured
endorsements.295 Furthermore, recognizing the right of the company group
to the Marcel coverage fits within the Louisiana Civil Code articles on
third-party beneficiaries, so long as the intended benefit is express.296 An
examination of the economic factors that motivate oil companies to seek
additional insured status, however, undermines the assertion that
extending Marcel coverage to the company group comports with the
policy behind the LOIA.297 In order to bring clarity to this area of the law,
the Louisiana Legislature should revise the LOIA to allow for regardlessof-fault indemnity agreements so that parties may freely structure their
risk-allocation arrangements, subject to statutorily prescribed limitations
and conditions that ensure adequate protection of contractors.
III. REVISING THE LOIA WITH GUIDANCE FROM THE TOIA
Oil companies typically aim to avoid depleting their own insurance to
defend lawsuits brought by the employees of their contractors.298 By
tendering defense to the contractor’s insurer, the additional insured oil
company assures that its own insurance company is not brought into the
action.299 The oil company thus faces no risk of negative impacts on its
own insurance, like increased premiums and policy cancellations.300
Instead, these negative impacts will fall upon the contractor procuring the
coverage.301 The oil company’s own insurance is further insulated because
the oil company’s additional insured status precludes the contractor’s
insurer from suing the oil company or his insurance provider to recover
defense costs.302 This is because an insurer has no right of subrogation
against his insureds, including his additional insureds, if the money paid
294. See, e.g., Durr, 393 F. Supp. 3d 476.
295. See id. In addition, no case expressly “holds that a third-party is
prohibited from benefitting from someone else’s payment of the Marcel premium
on behalf of itself and the ‘Company Group.’” Id. at 489.
296. See LA. CIV. CODE. arts. 1978–82 (2018).
297. See generally Strode, supra note 191.
298. Id. at 704.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 705.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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out was within the defined scope of the coverage.303 Extending Marcel
coverage to the whole company group, by increasing the number of
additional insureds, increases the likelihood that claims for losses will be
made against the insurance policy of the contractor that procures the
coverage.304
The increased likelihood of claims against the contractor’s policy can
lead to a depletion of the amount of insurance coverage available to the
contractor, increased insurance premiums, and potentially even policy
cancellations.305 The insurer maintains a “loss experience” based on the
claims and losses made on the contractor’s policy, and when the insurer is
determining coverage and premiums for the future, the insurer takes the
losses and claims made on the contractor’s policy into account.306 A poor
loss experience will lead to higher insurance premiums and less coverage
in the future.307 In fact, the insurer may even refuse to renew the policy
altogether.308 The “material part” of the premium paid by the oil company
to secure Marcel coverage thus represents only a portion of the costs
associated with the additional insured endorsement.309 The hidden, future
costs of the additional insured endorsement are borne solely by the
contractor.310 Additional insured coverage can thus result in economic
burden-shifting, and this burden-shifting is out of line with the LOIA’s
single stated policy of protecting contractors.311 Thus, even the Marcel
exception is not entirely protective of contractors, and if courts are going
to continue to permit economic burden-shifting through risk allocation,
there is a much more effective way to do it than through Marcel.312 The
Louisiana Legislature should amend the LOIA to permit parties to allocate
risk effectively. Specifically, the Louisiana Legislature should revise the
LOIA to loosen its restrictions on regardless-of-fault risk allocation so that
other important policy goals—such as enhancing predictability in the
event of a loss and reducing litigation expenses—can also be promoted,
while simultaneously preserving certain protections provided to

303. Id.
304. Id. at 717.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 718.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See generally id. at 716–18.
310. Id. at 718.
311. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A) (2019); see also Marcel v. Placid Oil
Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
312. See discussion supra Part II.B.–C.
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contractors by placing limitations on the extent to which parties may
allocate risk on a regardless-of-fault basis.
Risk allocation in the form of regardless-of-fault indemnity serves
utility and efficiency purposes that benefit both contracting parties.313 Risk
allocation developed for a variety of reasons, including the difficulties and
expenses involved in determining proportionate fault in accidents that
arise in common workplaces, and the availability of and reliance upon
insurance.314 Given that oil and gas activity presents danger and risk to
both person and property, losses are likely, and parties need to plan for
losses before they arise in order to minimize the negative impacts of
them.315 A proper risk-allocation scheme, one that includes indemnity,
insurance, and other contractual provisions, serves to mitigate the effects
of casualty risks, foster certainty in the case of an accident, and reduce
litigation costs.316 Further, by removing any unpredictability about what
risks a party will be responsible for absorbing, regardless-of-fault
indemnity provisions allow parties to accurately evaluate risk exposure
and obtain appropriate insurance.317 This clear understanding of potential
risk exposure enables a contractor to determine if taking the job is worth
the risk.318 Under the Marcel exception, the contractor lacks this ability to
accurately evaluate his risk exposure during the negotiations phase, before
the job commences.319 This problem is further exacerbated when the oil
company and the contractor agree to extend the Marcel coverage to thirdparty members of the company group.320 In revising the LOIA, the
Louisiana Legislature should look to the TOIA for guidance.321 The TOIA
strikes the right balance between protecting contractors and permitting
parties to allocate risk in order to better plan for losses before they arise,
and the Louisiana Legislature should adopt the insurance-related
exception provided for under the TOIA.322

313. See generally Pugh, supra note 19; Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
314. Pugh, supra note 19.
315. Flanagan & Pesce, supra note 6.
316. Id.
317. Moomjian, supra note 149, at 19–20.
318. See generally id. at 19.
319. See generally id.; see also Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 569–70
(5th Cir. 1994).
320. See generally Moomjian, supra note 149; see also Marcel, 11 F.3d at
569–70.
321. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 127.001–.007 (West 2019).
322. See id. § 127.005.
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Both Texas and Louisiana have economies that are strongly tied to oil
and gas.323 Additionally, the legislatures of both Texas and Louisiana have
each enacted anti-indemnity statutes, the TOIA and LOIA, respectively,
aimed at protecting contractors in the oil and gas industry.324 The TOIA’s
stated purpose mirrors that of the LOIA: “remedying an inequity fostered
on certain contractors by indemnity provisions” in certain oilfield
contracts.325 Specifically, the Texas Legislature enacted the TOIA to
relieve contractors of the large and uncertain liabilities caused by
provisions in oilfield contracts that required the contractor to assume the
financial responsibility of the oil company’s negligence or fault.326 The
legislative history to the TOIA explains that, at the time of its original
enactment, contractors found it difficult or impossible to obtain liability
insurance to cover their indemnity obligations.327 Thus, the TOIA, similar
to the LOIA, declares null and void indemnity provisions in certain oilfield
contracts to the extent those provisions purport to indemnify the
indemnitee for its negligence or fault.328
Once insurance for oil and gas operations became readily available,
however, oil companies and contractors in Texas lobbied the Texas
Legislature to amend the TOIA.329 The Texas Legislature responded to
these lobbying efforts by amending the TOIA to expand the exceptions
provided for under the statute.330 This exception, found at Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code § 127.005, permits parties to include
regardless-of-fault indemnity provisions in their contracts when liability
insurance supports the indemnity agreement.331 Specifically, § 127.005 of
the TOIA permits: (1) unilateral indemnity obligations, but the amount of
insurance required may not exceed $500,000,332 and (2) mutual indemnity
323. See generally Kehoe, supra note 13.
324. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.002; see also LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:2780(A) (2018).
325. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.002.
326. Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. of N. Am., NL Indus. Inc., 845 S.W.2d 794, 803
(Tex. 1992).
327. Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp., 24 S.W.3d 344, 348 (Tex.
2000).
328. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.003; accord LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:2780(A), (B).
329. Ken Petroleum Corp, 24 S.W.3d at 349 (citing Hearings on S.B. 1084
Before the Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, 71st Leg. (Mar. 28, 1989) (statement
of Senator Bob McFarland)).
330. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005; see also Ken Petroleum
Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 349.
331. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005.
332. Id. § 127.005(c).
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obligations, but the indemnity obligation is limited to the amount of
insurance coverage or qualified self-insurance that the parties have equally
obtained.333 Under § 127.005, the indemnitor’s indemnity obligation will
be limited to the dollar amount of insurance coverage that the indemnitor
procures to support his obligations under the indemnity agreement. The
contractor receives protection from unreasonable burden-shifting through
limitations in § 127.005 in the following manner: if the indemnity
agreement is unilateral, the indemnitor’s indemnity obligation is capped at
$500,000, a relatively small amount by industry standards; whereas, if the
agreement is mutual, the indemnity obligations of each party as indemnitor
will be limited to the amount of insurance coverage equally provided by
both parties. Because the amount of insurance procured by the contractor
is likely to be lower than that obtained by the oil company, the “equallyprovided” limit protects a smaller contractor from being forced, by a large
oil company, to indemnify the oil company up to the amount of insurance
or self-insurance procured by the oil company. The exception provided

“Unilateral indemnity obligation” means an indemnity obligation in an
agreement pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water or to a mine for a
mineral in which one of the parties as indemnitor agrees to indemnify
the other party as indemnitee with respect to claims for personal injury
or death to the indemnitor’s employees or agents or to the employees or
agents of the indemnitor’s contractors but in which the indemnitee does
not make a reciprocal indemnity to the indemnitor.
Id. § 127.001(6).
333. Id. § 127.005(b).
“Mutual indemnity obligation” means an indemnity obligation in an
agreement pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water or to a mine for a
mineral in which the parties agree to indemnify each other and each
other’s contractors and their employees against loss, liability, or damages
arising in connection with bodily injury, death, and damage to property
of the respective employees, contractors or their employees, and invitees
of each party arising out of or resulting from the performance of the
agreement.
Id. § 127.001(3). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted § 127.005(b) to mean:
“[T]he indemnity obligation is limited” to the amount of insurance that
is equally provided. If one party provides more insurance than the other,
the party providing the higher amount of coverage may not enforce its
right to indemnity beyond the amount of coverage that the other party
agreed to provide. And the party providing the lower amount of
insurance may not enforce its right to indemnity beyond its own amount
of coverage.
Ken Petroleum Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 350.
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under § 127.005 of the TOIA creates a major distinction between the
LOIA and the TOIA.334
The Louisiana Legislature should adopt the exception created under
§ 127.005 because doing so would relieve parties in Louisiana of the need
to rely on Marcel to allocate risk on a regardless-of-fault basis.335 The
Marcel exception has fallen short of meeting parties’ risk-allocation needs
because of the ambiguities and uncertainties that surround it.336 These
ambiguities and uncertainties do not exist with the TOIA’s exception
because, unlike the Marcel exception, the exception provided under the
TOIA does not require the indemnitee to pay any part of the premium in
order for the exception to apply.337 Although the TOIA does sacrifice the
complete contractor protection provided under the LOIA, the TOIA
provides a contractor with certainty as to the extent of his potential
indemnity obligations, which allows the contractor to accurately assess his
potential risk exposure and undertake appropriate risk management and
risk planning.338 The contractor benefits from an accurate evaluation of
potential risk exposure because it permits the contractor to better negotiate
with his insurer for protection from future negative impacts on the
contractor’s insurance policy.339 Moreover, the contractor still receives a
fair amount of protection from strong-arming through limitations on
indemnity agreements that are specified in § 127.005.340
As the LOIA currently stands, it does not allow indemnity on a
regardless-of-fault basis.341 The LOIA only permits indemnity where the
indemnitee is free from fault.342 This type of conditional risk allocation
334. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005, with LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:2780 (2018).
335. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005; Marcel v. Placid
Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
336. See discussion supra Part II.
337. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005.
338. See generally Moomjian, supra note 149, at 19, 20.
339. See generally Strode, supra note 191, at 718.
340. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005. These limitations
are as follows: (i) the $500,000 cap on unilateral indemnity agreements, which by
industry standards is a relatively minor amount of money, and (ii) for bilateral
agreements, both parties have a duty to indemnify, and the right to be indemnified,
for certain losses, and the indemnity obligation is limited to the amount of
insurance equally provided by both parties as indemnitor. Additionally, with
bilateral indemnity agreements, the contractor will also itself be indemnified by
the oil company for certain losses, so protection is less important in the context of
bilateral indemnity agreements.
341. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780 (2018).
342. See id. § 9:2780(B).
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requires that a determination of culpability be made in order to identify
which party is responsible for absorbing a particular risk.343 In effect, this
requires both parties to obtain insurance to cover the same risks, as a
determination of culpability—and the resulting contractual liability—can
only be made after the loss arises.344 The Marcel exception eliminates this
economic inefficiency by allowing the parties to obtain one insurance
policy to cover certain risks.345 The exception provided under the TOIA
also eliminates the economic inefficiency of purchasing two insurance
policies to cover the same risks but without the ambiguities and
uncertainties attendant to Marcel.346
Section 127.005 of the TOIA permits parties to freely allocate risk on
a regardless-of-fault basis, before a given loss arises, which increases
predictability.347 This predictability allows parties to rely upon their riskallocation provisions and undertake appropriate financial plans.348 A
straightforward risk-allocation scheme allows both contracting parties to
clearly and accurately predict the risks they will be responsible for
absorbing, which allows each party to adequately insure these risks.349
Section 127.005 serves the interests of both contracting parties.350
Moreover, the limitations placed on the permitted indemnity agreements
provide contractors with the protection that they need to avoid being
strong-armed into burdensome indemnity agreements.351 The Louisiana
Legislature will further the policy behind the LOIA while allowing parties
the freedom to allocate risks and insure the risks they assume by adopting
the exception provided for under the TOIA.
CONCLUSION
A law that prevents oil companies from strong-arming weaker parties
into contracts of adhesion and promotes safety in one of the state’s most
dangerous industries amounts to good legislation.352 The Louisiana
343. Moomjian, supra note 149, at 19, 20.
344. Id.
345. See generally Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994).
346. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005 (West 2019).
347. See generally Moomjian, supra note 149, at 19; Pugh, supra note 19.
348. See generally Pugh, supra note 19.
349. See generally Moomjian, supra note 149, at 19.
350. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005; see also Moomjian, supra
note 149, at 19.
351. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 127.005.
352. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A) (2018); see also Knapp v. Chevron USA,
Inc., 781 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Legislature aimed to accomplish as much by enacting the LOIA.353
Remedying this inequity, however, has come at the expense of the freedom
of parties to contract for oil and gas services in Louisiana.354 The LOIA
has also deprived parties of predictability with respect to the riskallocation provisions included in oilfield contracts.355 The broad language
of the LOIA and its broad judicial interpretation have resulted in a lack of
clarity and uniformity in the courts.356 Additionally, the broad construction
has had the effect of fostering an inequity upon oil companies and
contractors.357 The only way to restore clarity, uniformity, and
predictability in this area of the law is through legislation at the state level.
It is time for the Louisiana Legislature to respond to the unanswered
questions surrounding the Marcel exception by removing parties’ need to
rely on Marcel through the adoption of the exception provided for under
the TOIA. Once federal and state governments, along with private-sector
actors, bring the American economy back to life, Louisiana’s economy in
particular can benefit from the revisions to the LOIA proposed in this
Comment. These revisions will be especially attractive to oil companies,
but also to service companies. Assuming prices in the oil and gas markets
are able to improve and stabilize, oil companies will undoubtedly be eager
to get the hydrocarbons and, consequently, the cash flowing as soon as
possible. By attracting oil companies to drill off the coast of Louisiana,
these revisions can lead to a much-needed increase in jobs and income in
Louisiana.

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
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See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780(A); see also Knapp, 781 F.2d at 1130.
Panagiotis, supra note 10, at 205.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part II.
See generally Kehoe, supra note 13, at 1097.
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